and can be used with BB84 [Bennett84] or other quantum key distribution protocols.
Introduction
Controlling access to a large network of resources is one of the most common security problems. Familiar examples of authentication include the process of supplying a password to gain access to a computer, or use of a personal identification number (PIN) with an automatic teller machine. The user seeking authentication must provide some ticket that cannot be held by anyone else, either because user and system shared the secret at some point in the past, or both received the secret from some trusted third party with assurance that the communication was not intercepted.
Any pair of parties in a network should be able to communicate, but must be authorized to do so, which requires that their identities be authenticated. The fundamental problem is how to authenticate resources to each other while minimizing the number of cryptographic keys that must be distributed and maintained, given the potential for pairs of communicating resources. Conventional solutions are typically based on authentication protocols such as Kerberos or public key schemes, which use trusted servers to grant authentication tickets or certificates to the communicating parties.
Less sophisticated examples include the use of simple passwords on a network. Password or authentication key transmission may or may not be encrypted, depending on the level of risk.
This paper describes a solution based on a combination of quantum cryptography and a conventional secret key system (although a public key system could be used for the classical component as well). A novel feature of this approach is that even the trusted server cannot know the contents of the authentication ticket. Using quantum cryptography also avoids the need for timestamps and key expiration periods.
Protocol Description
This section describes the protocol under idealized conditions. A following section discusses the impact of transmission losses, detection rates and other limiting factors of physical implementations. We assume that each resource shares a secret key with a trusted server that an eavesdropper can read but not modify messages, and that resources can communicate with the trusted server over a classical and quantum channel. We also assume that the trusted server can be, in fact, trusted. 
Key bits measurement:
Since the key bits are entangled, Bob will observe the same measurement seen by Alice.
Tamper detection bits measurement:
With zero transmission loss and perfect detection, the tamper detection bits will match Tr's message with 100% accuracy. If an eavesdropper, Eve, has read the message the error rate for tamper detection bits will be 25%, since she has a 50% chance of guessing the correct basis, and a 50% chance that Alice and Bob will measure the correct polarization even if Eve chooses the wrong basis. In a practical implementation, the error threshold for tamper detection bits should be set as close to 0 as practical, for reasons discussed in a subsequent section. If the error rate for tamper detection bits exceeds the error threshold, the protocol is restarted.
6. To authenticate her identity to Bob, Alice sends to Bob the result of measuring the key bit sequence to provide confidence (with probability ) that the message is from Alice. The authentication key effectively serves as a session password, which is sent in the clear. Note that Alice may send only a portion of the key bit sequence, sufficient to authenticate her identity, while retaining the rest to be used as a shared secret key. That is, the protocol can incorporate key distribution as well as authentication. After step 6, Alice and Bob share a bit sequence resulting from their measurement of the key photons, and even Tr cannot know the bit sequence for the bits that were measured because the measurement result is not transmitted. Note also that after step 6, Eve will gain nothing by decrypting communications between the trusted server and Alice and Bob, because knowing the location of tamper detection bits is of no value after measurements are made on the key bits. This information needs to be protected for only a few seconds or milliseconds, making it possible -with sufficient key length -to resist attacks from even a quantum computer.
At the end of an exchange, some portion of Alice and Bob's shared bit sequence might be used as an encryption key as well, although doing so involves greater risk than using the bits as an authentication key because leaking partial information can make the key vulnerable. Privacy amplification techniques might be used to reduce Eve's information in this case [Bennett et al., 1995] . More on the potential for Eve guessing bit values is discussed in following sections.
Example
This section illustrates the protocol with a stepby-step example, referring to Figure 1 . In the figure, "EA(…)" means a message encrypted with the secret key shared by Alice and Tr, and "EB(…)" respectively for Bob; "/" and "\" are diagonally polarized photons; "--" and "|" are rectilinearly polarized photons; and "T" is an entangled photon. 
Analysis of Security Properties
This section considers possible attacks against the protocol and examines parameters required for a desired level of security.
Intercept-resend attack
Suppose that Eve intercepts the photon stream going to either Alice or Bob, and resends. In this case, she must guess the basis for the tamper detection bits, guessing incorrectly 50% of the time. Alice (or Bob) will measure the tamper detection bits according to the basis sent by Tr. If the tamper detection bits have not been measured by Eve, then the polarization measured by Alice will agree with that sent by Tr 100% of the time and Alice will observe an error rate of 0. If the tamper detection bits have been measured by Eve, then Alice will observe an error rate of .25.
Guessing which bits are for tamper detection and which for the authentication key is not a feasible strategy. Tamper detection bits are interspersed randomly, so the chance of picking the correct k key bits out of d k + bits is , which will be extremely small for reasonable values of and , where is the number of authentication key bits and d the number of tamper detection bits. Eve could try guessing a subset of the bits, hoping to get all k key bits without disturbing the tamper detection bits. The chance of this strategy succeeding for guessing a total of g bits is a product of the probability of getting all key bits and the probability of disturbing a tamper detection bit:
Eve has a tradeoff in that increasing the number of guessed bits, g, increases her chances by making it more likely to get all k key bits, but decreases them by raising the probability that an error detection bit will be disturbed, thus revealing her presence. Overall, Eve's chances of success increase as more bits are guessed. Reading an extra bit will increase the left side of the product by a factor of , or up to a limit of . As shown below, this limit is not reached if the probability of falsifying an authentication token and the probability of evading detection of eavesdropping are balanced. The best strategy for Eve, then, is to measure all bits and hope that the measurement does not induce an error detectable by Alice and Bob. Measuring all bits gives a chance of evading detection of . .
Suppose we wish to ensure a probability of no more than of an intruder falsifying an authentication token, and of evading detection of eavesdropping. The protocol has the perhaps unexpected property that more tamper detection bits are required than key bits, if we want to ensure that and are approximately equal.
As described above, and 
Distinguishing tamper detection bits
If Eve can distinguish the tamper detection bits from other bits, she can avoid detection by leaving them undisturbed. However, the location of the tamper detection bits is protected using the symmetric keys shared by Tr and the two parties. Eve would need to decrypt this information in real time, only a few seconds or milliseconds, for it to be useful because it is of no value after Alice and Bob have completed their measurements. Physical means cannot be used to distinguish between entangled and nonentangled bits if Eve has access to only one path (Tr-Alice or Tr-Bob), and thus only one of each pair, because the ability to do so would imply faster than light communication.
Multiple photon splitting
A persistent problem in quantum communication implementations is the difficulty of achieving single photon states. Signals normally contain zero, one, or multiple photons in the same polarization. The multiple photon splitting, or photon number splitting, attack on quantum protocols involves the eavesdropper deterministically splitting off one photon from each multi-photon signal [Brassard et al., 1999; Huttner et al., 1995] . If Eve measures every single photon and passes along n-1 photons undisturbed from each multi-photon state, then her chances of evading detection are increased because the number of tamper detection bits that are effective is reduced to , where is the probability of a single photon state, and the chance of evading detection becomes . Defending against this attack requires increasing the number of tamper detection bits by a factor of to reduce the chance of evading detection to an acceptable level.
Denial of service
The ability to write to or disconnect any channel would allow an attacker to disrupt communication, but this weakness is inherent in any non-redundant communication system. The protocol is therefore suited to networks where channels are assumed to be observable, but cannot be jammed or disconnected. 
Related Work

Conclusions and Future Work
This paper describes a protocol for authenticating resources in a network using properties of quantum entanglement. The protocol has a number of advantages over both classical authentication protocols and other quantum protocols. Incorporating conventional symmetric cryptography allows eavesdropping detection to be separated from key distribution, rather than relying strictly on error rates of transmitted keys to detect intrusions. However, an intruder would have only a few seconds or milliseconds to decrypt classically encrypted transmissions between trusted server and workstations.
As described, the protocol relies on idealized properties, and practical implementations may face constraints on transmission efficiency resulting from current technology constraints. The next step required for realization of the protocol is a thorough analysis of effects of these constraints. In particular, multiple rounds of photon distribution between the trusted server and network resources are likely to be required as a result of limits on detection efficiency. Measurements of the efficiency of current implementation schemes, particularly parametric down conversion and weak coherent pulse methods, will be needed.
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